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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

THE UNIFORM PROPERIY ACT IN PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN

W.

ENGLISH

Section 7. Conveyance of Future Interests.
"The conveyance of an existing future interest, whether legal or
equitable, is not ineffectual on the sole ground that the interest so
conveyed is future or contingent."
Section 8. Subjection of Future Interests to Claim of Creditors.
"The subjection to the claims of creditors of a future interest,
whether legal or equitable, is not prevented or avoided on the sole
ground that such interest is future or contingent."
These two sections may be dealt with appropriately together. Section seven
deals with the question of whether contingent future interests can be transferred
and Section eight subjects them to the claims of creditors. A creditor generally
asserts his claim through attachment, execution, or in bankruptcy proceedings, or
after the death of the debtor, by presenting a claim against his estate. Transferability is the broad test of what property will be subjected to bankruptcy proceedings. 1 Indeed, the power of the debtor to alienate inter vivos is a general test of
whether a creditor can reach the debtor's interest.2 So many of the cases which
deal with transferability of future interests approach the question as a result of
creditor's suits or of sheriff's sales, that it would involve a needless duplication
of citations to deal with these sections separately.
The cases do not seem to make any distinction between personalty and realty
in regard to these questions. Therefore no distinction will be considered here.
The questions which must be considered will be: First, is the interest transferable? Second, is there a transfer of a true legal interest or is it a mere contract
to convey which equity will recognize? This is important because it has been
held that an interest which is only transferable in equity is not subject to attachment execution s and will not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. 4 Third, is this
legally transferable interest subject to the claims of creditors?
*Continued from the October, 1941, issue, vol. 46, p. 37.
'Packer's Estate (No. 2), 246 Pa. 116, 92 A. 70 (1914) ; Suskin & Berry v. Romley (C.C.A.
N.C.) 37 F.(2d) 304 (1930) ; see, Federal Bankruptcy Act, sec. 702 (5), 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 110 (a)
(5); 42 DICK. L. REV. 92, 98; 45 DICK. L. REv. 223.
23 SImES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 194, sec. 737 (1936).
SPatterson v. Caldwell, 124 Pa. 455, 17 A. 18, 10 Am. St. Rep. 598, 23 W.N.C. 373 (1889).
4
See: In Re Twaddle (D. C. Pa.) 110 F. 145 (1901); In Re Wetmore, 102 F. 290 (1900).
But see 45 DIcK. L. REV. 223.
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INDEFEASIBLY VESTED FUTURE INTERESTS

It is well settled that indefeasibly vested future interests are transferable, 5
will pass to the trustee in bankruptcy, 6 and are subject to attachment 7 and execution. 8
The mere futurity of an interest will not therefore affect the question. Our
inquiry may be confined to future interests which are subject to some contingency. 9
The types of contingent future interests to be considered are the possibility
of reverter, right of entry for condition broken, contingent remainder, shifting
executory devise, and remainder vested subject to divestment. The first four of
these interests will vest only upon the future happening of an uncertain event.
The last mentioned estate, while technically vested, may be divested by some uncertain future event. All these interests have one element in common-their uncertainty of value.
TRANSFERS IN EQUITY
The equity courts of Pennsylvania are always willing to recognize the transfer of a contingent future interest or expectancy if it is supported by consideration. 1 0 Such a transfer, however, is not really a present transfer but rather a contract to convey in the future which Equity will enforce if and when the promisor
comes into the property which was the subject of transfer. We are not concerned
with this type of transfer but rather with the transfer of a future interest which
here and now exists and is subject to present assignment.
DEVISES AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION

Unless the contingent interest is of a sort which is conditioned upon the
continued life of the first taker, it will pass upon his death intestate to his heirs
5
Moses v. Dunkle, 1 Woodward 338 (1867); Eckert's Estate, 157 Pa. 585, 27 A. 781 (1893);
the point was assumed in, In Re Palm's Estate, 13 Pa. Super. 296 (1900) ; In Re Singer's Estate, 217
Pa. 295, 66 A. 548 (1907); In Re Yardley's Estate, 21 Pa. Dist. 518 (1912); In Re Winter's Estate,
29 Pa. Dist. 982 (1920) ; In Re Brolasky's Estate, 309 Pa. 30, 163 A. 292 (1932).
6In Re Twaddle (D. C. Pa.) 110 F. 145 (1901); see Packer's Estate (No. 2), 246 Pa. 116,
92 A.7 70 (1914).
1n Re Bloodhart's Estate, 2 Pa. Co. Ct. 476 (1886).
SHumphreys v. Humphreys, 2 Dall. 223, 1 Yeates 427. 1 L. Ed. 357 (1795); Bean v. Kulp, 7
Phila.9 650, 27 L. I. 61 (1870).
Possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken are for the purposes of this
article, considered as contingent future interests. If they were considered as vested, then mere
futurity would have to be considered more fully as a possible bar to alienation.
101n Re John Wilson's Estate, 2 Pa. 325 (1845); Power's Appeal, 63 Pa. 443 (1869); East
Lewisburg Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Marsh, 91 Pa. 96 (1879); Ruple v. Bindley, 91 Pa. 296
(1879); Devore's Estate, 89 Pa. Super. 47 (1926); see, Bayler v. Commonwealth, 40 Pa. 37
(1861).
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12
or next of kin." It is also clear that such contingent interests are devisable.
Therefore, we must concentrate upon the question of inter vivos transmissibility
of contingent interests.
POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTER AND RIGHTS OF ENTRY FOR
CONDITION BROKEN

In Pennsylvania at common law the possibility of reverter could be assigned, 13 and could be sold on execution. 14 A right of entry for condition broken
can also be assigned and is subject to execution. 15 In this respect the Pennsylvania judges have shown eminent common sense in obtaining a desirable result
without the aid of a statute.
FUTURE INTERESTS VESTED SUBJECT TO DIVESTMENT AND
EXECUTORY SHIFTING DEVISES

A remainder which is vested subject to total divestment by a condition subclaims of creditors. 17 The same
sequent is freely transferable 18 and is subject to
18
devises.
executory
rule is applicable to shifting
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS

By the Act of April 1, 1909, "All deeds . . .shall be construed to include
all the estate . . . of the grantor or grantors . . .and the reversions and remainders . . .thereof." 1 Under this act it has been assumed by the courts that con21

2°
tingent remainders will pass. This result merely confirms the common law.
22
In Stewart v. Neely it was held that a contingent remainder would not
merge with a life estate to cut off an alternate contingent remainder. The court
went on to say, in dicta, that a deed purporting to convey a contingent remainder
operates only as an estoppel in equity. This dictum is given strength28 by a previous holding that a contingent interest is not subject to attachment.

I1Chess's Appeal, 87 Pa. 362, 30 Am.Rep. 361 (1878); Lynch v. Lynch, 132 Pa. 422, 19 A.
281 (1889) ; In Re Christensen's Estate, 196 Pa. 325, 46 A. 495 (1900) ; In Re Shaw's Estate, 326
Pa. 456, 191 A. 159 (1937).
121n Re Edelman's Estate, 276 Pa. 503, 130 A. 457 (1928). See, Stewart v. Neely, 139 Pa.
309, 20 A. 1002 (1891); Brooke's Estate, 214 Pa. 46, 63 A. 411 (1906).
I3Scheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. 126 (1847); Siegel v. Lauer, 148 Pa. 236, 23 A. 996, 15 L.R.A.
v.Burdick, 51 Pa. Super. 446 (1912).
Beaver Township School District
547 (1892);
4
1 See, Scheetz v. Fitzwater, 5 Pa. 126 (1847).
15Pickle v.McKissick, 21 Pa. 232 (1853); see, McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140 (1851).
lSMontgomery v. Petriken, 29 Pa. 118 (1858); Musser's Estate, 12 York L. R. 145 (1899).
17Churchman's Estate, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 237 (1887); Packer's Estate (No.2), 246 Pa. 116, 92 A.
70 (1914).
v. Davis, 219 Pa. 585, 69 A. 62 (1908).
18Kenyon
9
1 Act of April 1, 1909, P.L. 91, sec. 2; Act of April 30, 1925, P.L. 404, 21 PS 3.
2OChew v. Chew, 266 Pa. 526, 109 A. 799 (1920).
21Rash's Estate, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 160 (1850); Whelen v. Phillips, 151 Pa. 312, 25 A. 44
(1892); Robbin's Estate, 199 Pa. 500, 49 A. 233 (1901); Carter v. Martin, 307 Pa. 515, 162 A.
220 (1932).
22139 Pa. 309, 20 A. 1002 (1891).
28Patterson v.Caldwell, 124 Pa. 455, 17 A. 18, 10 Am.St.Rep. 598, 23 W.N.C. 373 (1889):
of persons not yetascertained. In Stewart v.Neely the conin thiscase was in a class
The interest
tingency was not as to the person but merely as to an event. See, ATTACHMENT, infra, and cas
cited.
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The dictum of Stewart v. Neely is not supported by the great majority of
cases. In almost every case where the holder of the future interest at the time of
the assignment, was ascertained, and the contingency related to an event rather
24
than to the taker, it was held that the interest of the holder can be transmitted.
This would seem to be a present legal transfer since adequate consideration is
not required. 25 Where, however, the future interest is contingent not only as to
an uncertain vesting but also as to who shall take, an assignment by a prospective
taker is ranked as nothing more than an assignment of an expectancy, 26 which
may be enforced in equity but passes nothing at law. 27 This conclusion is in
accord with that reached in a recent note:
"The result in Pennsylvania then would seem to be that contingent
interests where the person is ascertained are freely alienable; and
where the person is not ascertained such a conveyance acts as a contract to convey which will be enforced in equity." 28
This conclusion cannot be reconciled with the language in every case.

In

Robbin's Estate2 9 there was a life estate and after the death of the lift tenants
and 20 years after the death of the testator the estate was to be divided up
among the nephews and nieces of the testator or their issue. One nephew assigned his interest for the benefit of creditors before it vested. The court sharply
distinguished the nephew's interest from a mere expectancy and said that it was
a real interest. On the facts, even if this were a contract to transfer in equity,
since the interest had vested when the action was brought, the result would have
been the same. But the language would seem to go further than treating it as a
mere equitable transfer.
SUBJECTION TO CLAIMS OF CREDITORS

Attachment and Execution.
It has been stated that "contingent future interests are not subject to attachment before they vest". 80 This rule has taken, unfortunately, a firm hold upon
the law of this Commonwealth. 3 ' Where the contingency happens after the

24

Whelen v. Phillips, 151 Pa. 512, 25 A .44 (1892); Robbin's Estate, 199 Pa. 500, 49 A. 233
(1901); In Re Richardson's Estate, 236 Pa. 136, 84 A. 70 (1912); see, Estate of Moss, 80 Pa.
Super. 323 (1923).
ZsSee, Phillip's Estate (No. 2), 205 Pa. 511 (1903); Whelen v. Phillips, 151 Pa. 312; Davidson v. Little, 22 Pa. 245 (1853)-this last was concerned with a vested interest.
26See,
In Re Twaddle (D.C. Pa.) 110 F. 145 (1901) ; In Re Wetmore, 102 F. 290 (1900).
27
See, Patterson v. Caldwell, 124 Pa. 455, 17 A. 18, 10 Am. St. Rep. 598, 23 W.N.C. 373
(1889).
2842 DICK. L. REv. 92, at 95 (1937).
29199 Pa. 500, 49 A. 233 (1901); and see, Rash's Estate, 2 Parsons 160 (1850).
3042 DIcK. L. REv. at 97 (1937).
3lPatterson v. Caldwell, 124 Pa. 455. 17 A. 18, 10 Am. St. Rep. 598, 23 W.N.C. 373 (1889);
Day v. New England Life Ins. Co., 111 Pa. 507, 4 A. 748, 56 Am. Rep, 297 (1886) ; see, Pennsylvania Company v. Youngman, 314 Pa. 274, 171 A. 617 (1934); but see Rash's Estate, 2 Parson's
Eq. 160 (1850).
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attachment but before the trial, and the interest is vested at the trial, the interest
32
is subjected to the attachment.
Strangely enough, the rule in regard to the sale of a contingent future interest on execution would seem to be different than the rule in regard to attachments. Execution is possible against a right of entry for condition broken,3" a
possibility of reverter, 31 a contingent remainder,3a and a shifting executory interest.36 It would seem therefore that while many of these interests are not subject to attachment, they can be sold on execution. Any such distinction is funda
mentally unsound. 87
ASSIGNMENTS

FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS

Assignments for the benefit of creditors are treated like any other transfers..
If an interest is transmissible either in law or equity, it would seem to pass under
such an assignment.38
BANKRUPTCY

By the Federal Bankruptcy Act the trustee receives from the bankrupt all
those interests which the bankrupt could transfer or which are subject to attachment or execution. 39 Therefore, the broad test of what the trustee will receive
is transmissibility under the state law. Thus it has been held that all future interests which are contingent as to the event will pass.' 0 But not those which are
4t
contingent as to the person.
CONCLUSION

All contingent future interests are freely transmissible except those which
by their limitation are uncertain as to the possessor. Even expectancies and their
kin, the future interests where the person is unascertainable, are transferable in
equity by a contract to convey in the future. Those interests which are transferable are subject to execution sale and proceedings in bankruptcy, but are not subject to attachment until they vest.

32Pennsylvania Company v. Youngman, 314 Pa. 274, 171 A. 617 (1934); Mechanics National
Bank35v. Buckman, 56 Pa. Super. 285 (1914).
See note 13, supra.
34
3

See note 12, supra.

6De Hass v. Bunn, 2 Pa. 335, 44 Am. Dec. 201 (1845) ; see, Drake v. Brown, 68 Pa. 223
(1871);
In Re Barker's Estate, 159 Pa. 518. 28 A. 365, 368 (1894).
6
3 See note 17, supra.
37The distinction is probably based on the fact that in Pennsylvania the attachment execution is
fundamentally a garnishment proceeding, while an execution is directly against the defendant's property. The present rule may be thought to protect the garnishee, but there seems to be no reason why

the defendant's interest in the property held by the garnishee should not be sold.
38See.
Robbin's Estate, 199 Pa. 500, 49 A. 233 (1901).
9

34 0 See, note 1, jupra, and cases cited.

packer's Estate (No. 2), 246 Pa. 116, 92 A. 79 (1914) ; Churchman's Estate, 4 Pa. Co. Ct.
237 (1887).
But see, 45 DICK. L. REV. 223.
41
1n Re Wetmore, 102 F. 290 (1900) ; In Re Twaddle (D.C. Pa.) 110 F. 145 (1901).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

It is seen, therefore, that the present Pennsylvania law is largely in accord
with sections seven and eight of the proposed act. Section eight might change
the present rule in Pennsylvania in regard to the attachability of contingent
future interests. The qualification of the present rule which allows a prior attachment to take effect upon an interest which vests after the writ was served
but before the trial so limits the present law that section 'eight would effect little
change in practical results. Any change would merely bring the law as to attachments in accord with the law of transferability and execution, and this, it is
contended, would be a desirable result.
Section seven might render interests, where the person is not ascertained,
presently transferable. However, it is not altogether clear that it would do so.
The section deals with "the conveyance of an existing future interest". It is
altogether conceivable that the Pennsylvania courts would consider this merely a
restatement of the present law and would rule that where there is a present
estate with a contingent remainder in a class not ascertainable until the termination of preceding estates, a potential member of that class would not be possessed of "an existing future estate" and that any conveyance by him would
merely be enforceable in equity. It is desirable to clear up any ambiguity on this
subject and therefore section seven should be clarified. It is suggested that the
ambiguity will be removed by the following wording:
"The conveyance of an existing future interest, whether legal or
equitable, is not ineffectual on the sole ground that the interest so
conveyed is future or contingent, or that the holder thereof is unascertained."
The passage of section eight in its present form and of section seven in
altered form is strongly recommended, since they will put in statutory form an
important, but by no means clear, phase of Pennsylvania law and will work
certain small but desirable changes in the present law.
Section 9. Conveyance of Land or Thing Other
Than Land not in the Possession of the Conveyor.
"Any act which would be effective as a conveyance inter vivos or as
a mortgage or as a testamentary disposition of property when the
land or thing other than land is in the possession of the conveyor,
is effective as a conveyance of the conveyor's interest therein, when
the land or thing other than land is out of the conveyor's possession whether adversely held or not."
This section is designed to do away with any vestige of the old concept
that a man cannot alienate what he does not actually possess. This concept was
based on the theory that where a man was out of possession of his land or his
chattels, he merely possessed a right of action, the transfer of which would be
champertous and therefore void. 1 It will now be our inquiry whether anything
13 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (5th ed.) 349; Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HAiv. I.
BODKIN, MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY (1935)
p. 7.

Rsv. 23, 25; E. H.
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remains of this doctrine either in regard to land or chattels in Pennsylvania.
LAND MORTGAGES

A mortgage of land in Pennsylvania is a transfer of a defeasible title by
the mortgagor to the mortgagee. 2 As such, it is merely a sort of conveyance by
deed. It follows therefore that if a man out of possession can make a conveyance he can mortgage the land. If the old doctrine has not been applied in ordinary transfers, it will surely not be applied to mortgage transfers.
DEVISES AND INTER VIVOS CONVEYANCES

Pennsylvania never adopted the old English common-law rule that the interest of a disseisee of land could not be transferred. It was early decided in
Stoeny v. Whitman3 that this phase of maintenance was inapplicable in Pennsylvania and therefore a man out of possession of his land could convey his interest to a grantee, who would receive good title. A few years after this decision,
its result was affirmed and extended to devises. In Humes v. McFarlaneO Chief
Justice Tilghman said:
"Of the right of a testator to devise land, of which he has been
disseised, I think there can be no question. The tenures attached
to the feudal system never having prevailed in Pennsylvania, we
have paid no regard to that principle of the English law which requires seizin in order to authorize the alienation of land by deed or
will." 5
The principle behind these cases was impliedly recognized by the legislature in the Act of April 13, 1807, which provided that actions of ejectment
would not abate on the death of the plaintiff or defendant but the person next
in interest might be substituted.6
There was an even closer implication of the rule in the Act of April 26,
1850, which provided that where an action of ejectment had been commenced
and then the plaintiff conveyed his interest in the land, the action would not be
discontinued and the bond of the purchaser or assignee might be substituted for
2Payne's Adm'r. v. Patterson's Adm'r., 77 Pa. 134, 1 W.N.C. 75, 32 LI. 4, 22 P.L.J. 66, 7
L.eg. Gaz. 20 (1874); Brooke v. Bordner, 125 Pa. 420, 17 A. 467, 24 W.N.C. 53 (1889); Alexander's Estate (No. 2), 34 D. & C. 169 (1938).
36 Binn. 416 (1814); also, Browne v. Browne, Fed. Cas. No. 2035, 5 Fed. Cas. 440, 1 Wash.
C. C. 429 (1806) ; Huist v. McNeil, Fed. Cas. 8936, 12 Fed. Cas. 1039, 1 Wash. C. C. 70 (1804) ;
Cresson v. Wilber, 2 Watts 272 (1834); Jarrett v. Tomlinson, 3 S. & R. 114 (1842); In Re Murray s Estate, 2 Dist. 881, 13 Pa. C. C. 70 (1893).
44 S, & R. 427.
51d.
at 435.
6
April 13, 1807, P.L. 296, 4 Sin. L. 476, sec. 3, 12 P.S. 12: "No writ of ejectment shall abate
by reason of the death of any plaintiff or defendant but the person or persons next in interest may
be substituted in the place of the plaintiff or defendant who shall have died pending the writ."
Under this section in Robb v. Simpson, 2 W.N.C. 68 (1875), the names of residuary devisees were
substituted for that of a decedent plaintiff.
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that of the original owner. 7
TRANSFERS OF PERSONALTY

When the owner of a chattel of which he was not at the time possessed,
transferred it to another person the early courts had difficulty in allowing the
assignee to bring an action for its recovery or value.8
Pennsylvania has had a little experience with this difficulty. In Overton v.
Williston9 it was decided that when the owner of a chattel sold it to the plaintiff after it had been converted by a wrongdoer, the plaintiff could not bring an
action of trover. This was decided on the basis that the plaintiff in trover had
to allege his right of possession at the time of the conversion, and said if he
could not do so, he must fail. This case cannot be authority, however, for any
proposition that the plaintiff does not have title to the chattel. It merely denies
him the remedy of trover. Even this rule would not, in all probability, be ad10
hered to in a modern court.
The true nature of a transfer of a chattel by an owner when it is in the
possession of another person was carefully analyzed in Woods v. Nixon.,t In
that case A bought a horse from B, who retained possession of it. A then sold
the horse to C for an old debt. C requested the horse from B who refused to
give it to him. B then brought replevin for the horse. The court in allowing
recovery for the plaintiff decided that the transaction between B and C was moie
than a mere assignment of a right of action, but it was rather a transfer of a
property interest. This case would unquestionably be followed today and its
principle is certainly sound.
Upon the death of the owner of a chattel which is in the possession of an12
other, all his rights go to his personal representative.
CONCLUSION

It seems, therefore, that the owner of either lands or chattels can convey
his interest in them when they are not in his possession, whether or not they are
adversely held or are merely subject to lease or bailment.
?April 26, 1850, P. L. 590, sec. 4, 12 P. S. 13: "When the title of a plaintiff in ejectment to
lands may have been changed by sale or assignmerit, after action is brought, the suit shall not be
affected thereby; but the purchaser or assignee may prosecute said action; and the verdict and judgment in said action shall enure to him, in the same manner that they would to the said plaintiff if
no sale or assignment had taken place; and the purchaser of the real estate in controversy may. be
substituted on record, by a motion in open court."

See Dihlon v. Dougherty, 2 Grant 99 (1853).

8Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 HARV. L. REV. 23.
931 Pa. 155 (1858).
10See, Commercial Banking Corp. v. Active Loan Co., 135 Pa. Super. 124, 4 A.(2d) 616
(1938). The court said that in the modern action of trespass (which in Pennsylvania combines
trespass de bonis, case, and trover) the old requirement of possession at the time of the conversion
would not disqualify a plaintiff who had title at the time of the suit.

1Add.
131, 1 Am. Dec. 364 (1793).
2

1 Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 447, sec. 35.

"All personal actions which decedent might have

commenced or in which he was liable to be sued are authorized to be prosecuted or defended by
executors or administrators."
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Section nine would not change the law of Pennsylvania. It is doubtful that
a Pennsylvania court would seriously concern itself with the problem behind
section nine, so antiquated does that problem appear. However, there has never
been a Pennsylvania statute directly on this subject. In regard to chattels few
cases have arisen where interests in a chattel adversely held, have been transferred. Outside of Overton v. Williston,1s no case directly on point has been
found, and the grounds of that undesirable opinion were technical. It is urged
therefore that since section nine is in conformity with modern Pennsylvania law,
and would clarify that law in statutory form, the section should be adopted.
However, the adoption of this section is certainly not important and unless
the entire act or substantial parts of it are to be adopted en masse, it seems questionable if section nine alone would be worth the trouble of enactment.
Section 10.

Estates in Fee Tail Abolished.
"The creation of fees tail is not permitted. The use in an otherwise
effective conveyance of property, of language appropriate to create
a fee tail, creates a fee simple in the person who would have taken
a fee tail. Any future interest limited upon such an interest is a
limitation upon the fee simple and its validity is dutermined accordingly. Nothing herein contained shall affect the operations of
Sections 11, 12 and 13 of this Act."

This section is designed to do away with the creation of estates tail. In providing that an estate tail limitation will create a fee simple it goes on to specify
that any limitation on the estate tail shall be taken as limited upon a fee simple
and will be dealt with accordingly. This specification is inserted to eliminate
any doubt as to how such limitations on the estate shall be considered. Any possible effect of this section or the Pennsylvania rule on Sections 11, 12 and 13
will be taken up in the discussion of those sections.
ESTATES TAIL IN PENNSYLVANIA

In Pennsylvania it was always held that estates tail were not possible in personalty.' However, under our common law, they flourished in realty.2 What is
the condition of estates tail in land today?
The legislature by the Act of April 27, 1855, provided:
"Whenever hereafter by any gift, conveyance or devise, an estate in
fee tail would be created according to the existing laws of this
state, it shall be taken and construed to be an estate in fee simple
1831 Pa. 155 (1858), supra, note 9.
lEichelberger v. Barnetz, 17 S. & R. 294 (1828); Smith's Appeal, 23 Pa. 9 (1854); Pott's
Appeal, 30 Pa. 168 (1856).
2Bender v. Fleurie, 2 Grant 345 (1856); Blair v. Miller, 30 W.N.C. 486 (1892)
Carter v.
McMichael, 10 S. & R. 429 (1823); Paxson v. Lefferts, 3 R. 59 (1831); and see authorities cited
in Seybert v. Hibbert, 5 Pa. Super..537 (1897).
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and as such shall be inheritable and freely alienable."s
This act does not specifically state what will be done with interests limited
upon what was before the act a fee tail. However, by judicial decision it has
been determined that a gift over after a fee tail must take effect, after the
statute, as an executory shifting interest if it is going to take effect at all. 4 Such
interests are therefore subject to the rule against perpetuities and will fail if they
do not vest within the legal period.
There is one possible difference between the present Pennsylvania law and
the proposed statute. In the statute it is stated, "The creation of fees tail is not
permitted." The Pennsylvania cases say that under the Pennsylvania statute an
estate tail can still be created. But it is then immediately converted into a fee
simple by the statute.5 This is merely a distinction without a difference. The
result is the same.
CONCLUSION

In Pennsylvania by operation of the Act of 1855, fees tail upon their creation become instantly converted into fees simple,6 and any interests limited upon
them must take effect as executory interests if at all. Therefore, the law of
Pennsylvania is in complete accord with section 10. The adoption of section 10
is not recommended. Its language is not superior to that of the present Act to
any appreciable degree, and there is no other reason for its adoption. It would
be useless legislation and could not affect the law.
Section 11.

Definite Failure of Issue.
"Whenever property is limited upon the death of any person without 'heirs' or 'heirs of the body' or 'issue' general or special or
'descendants' or 'offspring' or 'children' or any such relatives described by other terms, such limitation, unless a different intent is
effectively manifested, is a limitation to take effect only when such
person dies not having such relative living at the time of his death
or in gestation and born alive thereafter and is not a limitation to
take effect upon the indefinite failure of such relatives; nor, unless
a different intent is effectively manifested, does it mean that death
without such relative, in order to be material, must occur in the lifetime of the creator of the interest."

8April 27, 1855, P.L. 368, sec. 1, 68 PS 12. This was repealed as to devises by sec. 27 of the
Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403, 20 PS 225, and re-enacted as to devises in substantially the same
language
by sec. 13 of the same Act.
4
Nicholson v. Bettle, 57 Pa. 384, 25 L. 1. 309 (1868); see, Stouch v. Zeigler, 196 Pa. 489
(1900).
5
Seybert v. Hibbert, 5 Pa. Super. 544 (1897).
6Nicholson v. Bettle, 57 Pa. 384, 25 L.I. 309 (1868); Hackney v. Tracy, 137 Pa. 53, 20 A.
560 (1890); Crawford v. Withrow, 314 Pa. 497, 171 A. 894 (1934); 44 Pa. Super. 274 (1910);
Clindinst v. Clindinst, 45 York 173 (1932); Keeley v. Moon, 22 D. & C. 237 (1934).
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This section deals with three problems of construction of wills and deeds.
By providing that "death without issue" will mean death without ". . . such
relative living at the time of his death . .." a presumption is raised against a
construction which would make such a limitation mean "death without ever having had issue".
This section also raises a presumption against an indefinite failure of issue
and is in favor of the more natural construction. By the "indefinite" construction the prior estate would not terminate until the direct inheritable line of the
first taker had terminated.
Finally, by its provision that such death, to be material, need not occur in
the lifetime of the creator of the interest, a presumption is raised in favor of the
construction that death without issue really means what it says and that a gift
over upon such a limitation will take effect or at least be eligible to do so whenever the death occurs. This does not, however, cover the situation whete there
is a prior estate to A for life with a remainder to B in fee, but if B "dies without issue" then to C. The question of whether B's death without issue must be
before the death of A to let C recover is left open by the proposed Act.
Since these three problems are dealt with in section eleven, it will be well
to take them up in order and observe the way that Pennsylvania has dealt with
them.
DEATH WITHOUT EVER HAVING HAD CHILDREN

This construction has not been specifically considered by the courts of Pennsylvania. Doubtless in many cases it might have been argued but it has either
not been urged upon the courts or they have disregarded it.
The result of this construction would be that where there is a devise "to A
and his heirs, and if A dies without issue, then to B and his heirs", the birth of
a child to A would indefeasibly vest the estate in A even though the child might
subsequently die before A and A would die without issue living at his death.1
This construction is strained and artificial and it seems doubtful that a
Pennsylvania court would consider it unless forced to do so by the words of the
testator.
DEFINITE FAILURE OF ISSUE

At common law in Pennsylvania there was a strong presumption that where
there was a gift to "A and his heirs and if A died without issue, then to B and
his heirs," the death "without issue" meant an indefinite failure of issue and in
land created an estate tail.2 After the Act of April 27, 1855,8 such estates tail
12 SImEs, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936), sec. 346.
2
Haines v. Witmer, 2 Yeates 400 (1798) ; Clark v. Baker, 3 S. & R. 470 (1817) ; Caskey v.
Brewer, 17 S. & R. 441 (1828) ; Hope v. Rusha, 88 Pa. 127 (1878).

SUp.4, section 10, note 3.
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were construed as fees simple.' The presumption for the indefinite failure construction was even extended to personalty.5 The result therefore was that A
would receive a fee simple in Blackacre, which might or might not be subject to
an executory shifting devise in favor of B. We shall deal with that later.
This "indefinite failure" construction was, of course, merely a presumption
which might be rebutted by a sufficient indication that the testator intended a
definite failure of issue.8
By the Act of July 9, 1897, the legislature raised a statutory presumption
that "die without issue" meant a failure of issue during the life or at the death
of the first taker, and that an indefinite failure of issue was not meant unless
clearly indicated. 7
This statute reversed the common law presumption. Under it, the presumption is in favor of definite failure of issue and against a construction which
would allow indefinite failure of issue. 8
Pennsylvania is in accord with section 11 in approving a definite failure
of issue construction. There is, however, one more part to section eleven which
is not contained by the Pennsylvania statute. I refer to the clause at the end of
section 11:
, * . Nor, unless a different intent is effectively manifested, does
it mean that death without such relative, in order to be material,
must occur in the lifetime of the creator of the interest."
This part of the section rejects a presumption in favor of substitutional gifts rather
than limitations to take effect in succession and creates a presumption for the
latter, or successional, construction.
THE GIFT OVER AS SUBSTITUTIONAL

Suppose that a testator left a devise "To A and his heirs", but if A dies
without issue him surviving, then to B and his heirs. A survives the testator and
4Graham v. Abbott, 208 Pa. 68, 57 A. 178 (1904); Arnold v. Muhlenberg College, 227 Pa.
321, 76 A. 30 (1910); Horton v. McCall, 233 Pa. 405, 82 A. 472 (1912).
6Hoff's
Estae, 147 Pa. 636 (1892) ; see, Eichelberger v. Barnitz, 9 Watts 447 (1840).
6
Rapp v. Rapp. 6 Pa. 45 (1847); Johnson v. Currin, 10 Pa. 498 (1849); Ingersoll's Appeal,
86 Pa. 240 (1878); Stoner v. Wunderlich, 198 Pa. 158, 47 A. 945 (1901); Mebus Estate, 273 Pa.
505, 117 A. 340 (1922); Parkhurst v. Harrower, 142 Pa. 432 (1891); see, Appeal of Van Sycel,
319 Pa. 347, 179 A. 721 (1935).
7Act of July 9, 1897, P.L. 213, sec. 1, 21 PS 9. "In any gift, grant, devise or bequest of real
or personal estate, the words 'die without issue' or 'die without leaving issue,' or 'have no issue,' or
any other words which may impute either want or failure of issue of any person in his lifetime, or
at the time of his death, or an indefinite failure of his issue, shall be construed to mean a want or
failure of issue in the lifetime or at the death of such person, and not indefinite failure of his issue,
unless a contrary intention shall appear by the deed, will or other instrument in which such gift,
grant, devise, or bequest is made or contained." This was repealed as to devises and bequests by
sec. 27, Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 403; and reenacted as to wills and devises by sec. 14.
8Dilworth v. Schuylkill Imp. Land Co., 219 Pa. 527, 69 A. 47 (1908) ; Lewis v. Link-Belt, 222
Pa. 139 (1908) ; Smith v. Piper, 231 Pa. 378, 80 A. 877 (1911) ; In Re English's Estate, 270 Pa. 1,
112 A. 913 (1921). Compare the Pennsylvania statute with the English Wills Act from which its
language is drawn, 1 Vict. c. 25, sec. 29 (1837).
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later dies leaving no issue. On a casual glance at the limitation it would seem
that B is entitled to the property. That, however, would depend upon the theory
adopted.
There is in the limitation a gift to A in fee with a subsequent limitation
upon the fee in favor of B if A dies without issue. Many courts' have held
there is an inconsistency between the gift of a fee and the subsequent limitation, and consequently they say that the gift over is substitutional. That is, the
gift over will only take effect if A die without issue before the death of the testator and if he survives the testator he takes the property free of any executory
limitation in B.
The second theory would say that the testator intended what he said and
meant that if A dies without issue at any time, the exvecutory shifting devise in
B would vest the property in him.
Where does Pennsylvania stand in this clash of theories?
In Caldwell v. Stilton 1° the testator devised land to his wife for life or
widowhood and then to his children and their heirs and assigns as tenants in
common, and if either of the children dies, then to his children, and if the child
dies without issue born alive, then to the surviving children. It was held that
each of the children took an indefeasable interest upon the death of the testator.
The court reasoned that there was a gift over if a child died, on the wording of
the devise, no matter how he died. This was inconsistent with the gift in fee
and the only way to reconcile the two contradictory intents of the testator was
to say that they were substitutional gifts.11
This decision was sound since the devise was substantially "to A in fee, but
if he dies, then to B." There is no way for th fee in A to have effect barring
immortality. There was a real inconsistency which was removed by the only construction which would reconcile the two limitations.
The substitutional principle of Caldwell v. Stilton was, however, extended
by Mickley's Appeal 12 to a devise to sons and daughters of the testator in fee
and "if a son should die without leaving issue living at his death" then over to
surviving children and issue of dead ones per stirpes. The court held that upon
the death of the testator the sons took absolute interests. The decision was not
logical since there is here a gift in fee with an executory shifting devise which
would not be inconsistent with the gift in fee. This case, however, has been fol92 SIMEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, secs. 326 and 328.

1013 Pa. 152 (1850).
11Bell, J., at p. 157, quoted approvingly the following from Powell on Devises: "Where a
devise in fee is followed by several alternative limitations over, which aggregately provide for the
death of the devisee under all circumstances; as where there is a devise over if he die, leaving children, and another if he die without children, the case then becomes analogous to that of a limitation
if he die generally, and accordingly the words are held to refer to the death of the devisee in the
lifetime of the testator".
1292 Pa. 514 (1880).
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lowtd or approved by numerous Pennsylvania decisions.18 Therefore the Pennsylvania rule is that in the absence of clear evidence of contrary intent, a devise
or bequest to one in fee with a gift over if the first taker dies, or dies without
issue, or other terms meaning death without living descendants, the gift over
will be construed as substitutional, and if the first taker survives the testator he
receives an indefeasible fee.
If the testator manifests his intent to treat the first takers as living at a
period subsequent to his death, then the substitutional presumption is overcome
and the rule of Mickley's Appeal is not applied. 14 This, however, does not
mitigate or narrow the effect of the rule when the expression "die without issue"
or a similar phrase is used without further explanation of the testator's intent.
Where there is a postponed gift, the contingency of death without issue
must occur before the end of the period of postponement in order to let the gift
over take effect.15 Thus, if there is a gift to A for life, with a remainder to B
in fee, but if B dies without issue then to C, B's death without issue must occur
during the preceding life estate in order to give C any claim. If B survives A, he
takes an indefeasible interest.
This particular problem is not covered by the proposed Act. It seems desirable to specifically provide for this problem and to discard the presumption in
favor of the substitutional contentions.
CONCLUSION

Section eleven is in accord with Pennsylvania law insofar as it raises a presumption for definite failure of issue. However, in rejecting the substitutional
gift theory which is the rule of Mickley's Appeal, it is completely opposed to
Pennsylvania law.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has read the substitutional theory into
the Pennsylvania law and has declared:
"... unless the legislature amends the Act our construction of it
• ..must have the same effect as if written into the body of the
statute at the time of its enactment, and should not be altered by
the courts . . .,,6

13Cooper v. Leaman, 212 Pa. 564, 61 A. 1106 (1905); Flick v. The Forest Oil Co., 188 Pa.
17, 41 A. 535 (1908); Ault v. Karch, 220 Pa. 366, 69 A. 857 (.1908); Moorhead's Estate, 180
Pa. 119, 86 A. 647 (1897) ; Stark's Estate, 264 Pa. 232, 107 A. 699. (1919) ; Freeman's Estate, 281
Pa. 190, 126 A. 270 (1924); Lerch's Estate, 309 Pa. 23, 159 A. 868 (1932); see, In Re Haydon's
Estate,4 334 Pa. 403, 6 A.(2d) 581 (1939).
1 Haydon's Estate, 334 Pa. 403, 6 A.(2d) 581 (1939); Daniel's Estate, 27 Pa. Super. 358
(1905); Seeley v. Munger, 13 Erie 117 (1929); see, Mebus's Estate, 273 Pa. 505, 117 A. 340
(1922).5
l Fitzwater's Appeal, 94 Pa. 141 (1880); McCormick v. McElligott, 127 Pa. 230, 17 A. 896
(1889); Shearer v. Miller, 185 Pa. 149, 39 A. 846 (1898); In Re Samuel's Estate, 10 A.(2d) 45,
- Pa.6 - (1939); see, Mayer v. Walker, 214 Pa. 440, 63 A. 1011 (1906).
1 Lerch's Estate, 309 Pa. 23 at 28, 159 A. 868 (1932).
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It has already been explained how the rule of Mickley's Appeal has grown
up. It is logical to say that where there is a gift "to A in fee but if A dies, then
to B in fee," this should be construed as substitutional, since it is the only way
to reconcile absolutely contradictory expressions. However, it is not logical to
extend this rule to the case where the limitation is "to A in fee, but if A dies
without issue, then to B in fee." The limitations here are not contradictory. It
is perfectly possible to have a fee subject to a shifting executory interest, and it
is contended that interest should be given effect.
It should be the endeavor of the courts and legislature to lay down rules
which will really approximate the testator's intent, which would accomplish what
he would desire if he had foreseen the problem. It is highly improbable that the
rule of Mickley's Appeal accomplishes the intent of many testators. It is rather a
rule to defeat intent.
It is very strongly urged therefore that the latter part of section
be made part of the law of the Commonwealth.
It is recommended that section

11

11

should

be adopted in its entirety and that section

1 of the Act of July 9, 1897, be repealed with section 14 of the Act of June 7,

1917. However, it may be deemed that those Acts should be retained, in which
event it is recommended that section 1 of the Act of July 9, 1897, be amended to
read:
"In any ift, grant, devise or bequest of real or personal estate, the
words 'die without issue' or 'die without leaving issue' or 'have no
issue', or any other words which may import either want or failure
of issue of any person in his lifetime, or at the time of his death,
or an indefinite failure of issue, shall be construed to mean a want
or failure of issue in the lifetime or at the death of such person;
and not indefinite failure of his issue, unless a contrary intention
shall appear by the deed, will or other instrument in which such
gift, grant, devise or bequest is made or contained; nor shall it
mean that death without such issue, in order to be material, must
occur in the lifetime of the creator of the interest, unless a contrary
intention shall appear."

It is also suggested that if the substitutional theory is also to be discarded
in regard to postponed gifts, the last sentence should read:
"... must occur in the lifetime of the creator of the interest, or
during a preceding estate, unless a contrary intention shall appear."
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The Rule in Shelley's Case Abolished.
"Whenever any person, by conveyance, takes a life interest and in
the same conveyance, an interest is limited by way of remainder,
either mediately or immediately, to his heirs, or the heirs of his
body, or his issue, or next of kin, or some of such heirs, heirs of
his body, issue, or next of kin, the words 'heirs' 'heirs of the body'
'issue' or 'next of kin' or other words of like import used in the
conveyance, in the limitations therein by way of remainder, are not
words of limitation carrying to such person an estate in the property, but are words of purchase creating a remainder in the designated heirs, heirs of the body, issue, or next of1 kin."
This section does away with the rule in Shelley's Case. This rule was that
where there was a prior estate of freehold in a person, and a subsequent remainder
of the same quality, legal or equitable, in the same instrunient to the heirs, general
2
or special, of that person, the heirs took no estate, but the ancestor took an estate
of inheritance corresponding in quantum to the class of heirs who were specified
as remaindermen.
This section covers both wills and deeds and specifically negatives the idea
that "heirs" or similar terms will be words of limitation, but rather will be
words of purchase in situations where the rule applied.
It is necessary now to consider whether the Rule in Shelley's Case is the law
of Pennsylvania, and if so, how, and to what, it is applied.
Section 12.

THE RULE APPLIED TO PERSONALTY

At common law in Pennsylvania it seems clear that the Rule in Shelley's Case
will not be applied to personalty as a rule of law. In Dull's Estate,' the interest
on a charge on land of $2000 was to be paid to his heirs. The court in holding A
had only a life estate, conceded that in a devise of realty the testator's words would
have created a fee and went on to say:
"The exception made by the rule in Shelley's Case does not extend to
bequests of personalty and though the analogy may sometimes, in deguide, be followed, it is never allowed to defeat a
fault of a better
4
plain intent."
This result has been followed. 6
Rep. 93, Serj. Moore's Rep. 163, 1 Anders. 69.
11
2
CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY (2nd ed. 1911), 152-153.

"Grammatically the construction of the

second limitation might be, to give a remainder by purchase to the specified heirs . . . But the law
puts upon the limitation to the heirs a different construction, not giving to them any estate at all by
purchase, but taking account of this mention of the heirs only for the purpose of giving a corresponding estate to the specified ancestor ... in limitations coming within the rule in Shelley's Case,
the word heirs is not a word of purchase but a word of limitation."
3217 Pa. 358, 66 A. 567 (1907).
4217 Pa. 358 at 359, 360.
SMitinger's Estate, 132 Pa. Super. 475, 1 A.(2d) 572 (1938); see, Hurd's Estate, 305 Pa. 394,
158 A. 174 (1932); Benefactor Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Latta, 106 Pa. Super. 156, 161 A. 757
This was a lower court case and on
(1932); see contra, Redmond's Estate, 12 Dist. 142 (1902).
its facts there was a clear intent on the part of the testator to give all to the first taker. In Appeal
oj Cockins and Harper, 111 Pa. 26 (1886) and in Little's Appeal, 117 Pa. 14 (1887) the rule was

applied to personalty. But the court did not seem to have the question squarely presented whethet
it should be applied or not.
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From the language of the cases, however, it would seem that the rule might
be applicable to personalty as a rule of construction. However, in Mitinger's
Estate6 the court said:
"The legislature by the Act of July 15, 1935 . . . radically modified the effect of the rule in Shelley's case. While that Act is not
directly applicable it indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to make a marked change in the law. Under such circumstances we certainly would not extend the rule
7 in Shelley's case beyond the clear import of previous decisions.It seems doubtful therefore that the rule in Shelley's case would be used as
even a rule of construction as applied to personalty in Pennsylvania.
THE RULE APPLIED TO REALTY

The Rule in Shelley's Case has been consistently applied to realty by Pennsylvania common law.8 It is a rule of law and not a rule of construction 9 although in wills it is not applied where the testator has indicated that he meant
the first taker to have only a life estate and the "heirs" or "issue" to be a definite class taking by purchase. 10 The rule applies to equitable as well as legal
estates." But it does not apply where there is an equitable life interest and a
legal remainder. 12 It is clear therefore that the Rule in Shelley's Case has been
strongly imbedded in the common law of Pennsylvania. It remains to be seen
what kinds of limitations invoked its operation.
LIMITATIONS SUBJECT TO THE RULE

There are various limitations to which the Rule in Shelley's Case may be
applied. Where there is a transfer to A for life with a remainder to his heirs,' 3
or to his legal heirs, 1" the rule will usually apply and give A a life estate with a
remainder to himself in fee which will merge to give him a fee. Where the remainder is to A's issue' 5 or the "heirs of his body",' 6 A would receive a fee tail
which would be enlarged to a fee simple. It is perfectly possible to apply the
6

Supra, note 5.
7132 Pa. Super. at 483, 1 A.(2d) 572 (1938). The Act of 1935 will be considered infra.
8Baughman's Lessee v. Baughman, 2 Yeates 410 (1798); Hileman v. Bouslaugh, 13 Pa. 344,
53 Am. Dec. 474 (1850); Pratt v. McCawley, 20 Pa. 264 (1853); Stigers v. Dinsmore, 193 Pa.
482, 944 A. 440, 74 Am.St. Rep. 702 (1899).
Hileman v. Bouslaugh, supra; Klepner v. Laverty, 70 Pa. 70 (1871) ; Allen v. Markle, 36 Pa.
117 (1859); Grimes v. Shirk, 169 Pa. 74, 32 A. 113 (1895).
lOPowell v. Board of Domestic Missions, 48 Pa. 46 (1865); Perry v. Lowber, 49 Pa. 483
(1865); Abbott v. Jenkins, 10 S. & R. 296 (1823).
IlPratt v. McCawley, jupra, note 8; Findlay's Lessee v. Riddle, 3 Binn. 139, 5 Am. Dec. 355
(1810).
12Little v. Wilcox, 119 Pa. 439, 13 A. 468, 21 W.N.C. 215. 45 L.I. 283, 5 Lanc. L.' Rev. 79
(1888); Hemphill's Estate, 180 Pa. 95, 26 A. 409 (1897); Eshbach's Estate, 197 Pa. 153, 46 A.
905 (1900).
1Auman v. Auman, 21 Pa. 343 (1853); Carson v. Fuhs, 131 Pa. 256, 18 A. 1017 (1889);
Shapley v. Diehl, 203 Pa. 566, 53 A. 374 (1902) ; Munts v. Whitcomb, 40 Pa. Super. 553 (1909).
1"Steiner v. Kolb, 57 Pa. 123 (1868) ; Quillman v. Custer, 57 Pa. 125 (1868).
l6Armstrong v. Michener, 160 Pa. 21, 28 A. 447 (1894); Kleppner v. Laverty, 20 Pa. 70
(1871).6
1 Lessee of Baughman v. Baughman, 2 Yeates 410 (1798); Philadelphia Trust, Safe Dep. and
Ins. Co.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. 209, 9 W.N.C.'289, 14 Phila. 320, 38 LI. 402 (1880).
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rule to "children"1 7 or "descendants"," s if it can be shown that the testator used
these words as synonymous with words of inheritance.19
Another thing is worthy of note. It is not necessary that the preceding freehold estate be immediately before the remainder so that they can merge upon
application of the rule. The rule will still operate even though there is an intervening estate in remainder. The first taker will have a life estate and also a re2t
mainder in fee.
It is also not necessary for the Rule to work that the remainder interest be
a vested one. Thus where there is a gift to A for life, remainder to his oldest
son living at his death, but if he die without a surviving son, then remainder to
his heirs, the Rule works to give him a contingent remainder in fee so that on
21
his death without a son the property is subject to his testamentary disposition.
LIMITATIONS NOT SUBJECT TO THE RULE

In order to get a full picture of the way in which the Rule in Shelley's Case
was applied it would be well to consider some instances where it is not applied.
By breaking down the definition of the Rule in Shelley's Case we find that
there are five elements which must be present before the Rule is applied: First,
the ancestor must have a prior estate of freehold. If he has anything less than a
life estate, such as a term for years, the Rule cannot apply. 22 Second, the subsequent estate in the heirs must be an estate in remainder. An executory devise
to the heirs of the ancestor will not invoke the Rule.23 Third, this remainder
must be to the "heirs" or "issue" or some other such term in the sense of those
taking in inheritable succession under the ancestor, and not as a class to which
the testator intended to give a remainder directly as purchasers. Thus, if the testator leaves a remainder to the "issue of A" and it is clear that he meant the
"children of A", the Rule will not apply.2 4 Fourth, the freehold of the ancestor
and the remainder to the heirs must be both of the same type of estate. Thus
where there is an active trust of land for A for life with a legal remainder to
the heirs of A, the rule will not govern the case.2 6 Fifth, both estates, the freehold and the remainder, must be created by the same instrument. Therefore the
17 Williams v. Leech, 28 Pa. 89 (1857) ; Sheeley v. Neidhammer, 182 Pa. 163, 37 A. 939, 4
W.N.C. 545 (1897).
lSSee,
Lea v. Sanson, 245 Pa. 392, 91 A. 611 (1914).
9
1 The whole problem is ably discussed in Guthries' Appeal, 37 Pa. 9 (1860) and in Seybert v.
Hibbert, 5 Pa. Super. 537 (1897).
Z0See, Doebler's Appeal, 64 Pa. 9 (1870); Kleppner v. Laverty, 70 Pa. 73 (1871).
2lEby v. Shank, 196 Pa. 426, 46 A. 495 (1900).
221 SIMEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, sec. 119 (1936).
In Kuntsleman's Estate, 136 Pa.
231bid, sec. 20; and see Hess v. Hess, 67 Pa. 119 (1870).
142, 20 Am. St. Rep. 909 (1890) the husband and mother of the lifi tenant were excluded from
"heirs". This defeated the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case. In Bennett v. Morris, 5 Rawle
9 (1834) a remainder for life to "heir" of A was not within the Rule. The remainder must be in
fee. 2 4
See Gernet v. Lynn, 31 Pa. 94 (1857); Robbins v. Quinliven, 79 Pa. 333 (1875); see, Stout
v. Good,
245 Pa. 383, 91 A. 613 (1914).
25
See, Townes Estate, 260 Pa. 443, 103 A. 875 (1918) ; see supra, note 12, and cases cited.
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creation of a freehold in A and the subsequent creation of a remainder to his
26
heirs will not be within the Rule.
STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS OF THE RULE

The Act of 1897 created a presumption in favor of a definite failure of
issue construction. 27 This indirectly affected the Rule in Shelley's Case in regard
to one of its minor applications. Before this Act where there was a gift to "A
for life but if he dies without issue then to B" there was an implied gift in remainder to the issue of A. Thus, the limitation was made to read "to A for life,
remainder to the issue of A, but if A dies without issue to B in fee". Such a
limitation was subject to the Rule in Shelley's Case and by its application A received a fee tail which was in turn converted by the Act of 1855 into a fee
simple. 28 The Act of 1897 by saying that "die without issue" meant a definite
failure of issue made the implied gift to issue a gift to a definite class 29 who
would take as purchasers and here the Rule in Shelley's Case would not operate.
The legislature radically modified the Rule in Shelley's Case by the Act of
19351o which read:
"Grants or devises in trust or otherwise, becoming effective hereafter, which shall express an intent to create an estate for life with
remainder to the heirs of the life tenant, shall not operate to give
such life tenant an estate in fee."
This statute modifies but does not purport to abolish the Rule in Shelley's
Case. It does not, by its terms, cover a number of situations where the rule is
applied.81 It does not apply to personalty,32 but this is a minor defect since the
Rule itself does not, as we have seen, apply to personalty in Pennsylvania. 3 It
is unfortunate that the statute is so recent since there has not yet been time for a
body of cases to grow up interpreting its provisions. It is possible that the courts
will give the terms of the statute such a broad and liberal interpretation that all
of its defects will be remedied by judicial legislation. But for purposes of criticizing and evaluating the statute we must assume that the courts will not write
into the statute clauses which it does not contain.
The statute applies to a situation where the limitation expresses an intent
"to create an estate for life with a remainder to the heirs of the life tenant."
The Rule in Shelley's Case does not now apply therefore to a gift "to A for life
and then to the heirs of A". Does a limitation which reads "to A for life, remainder to B for life, remainder to the heirs of A" come within the statute? It
261 SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, sec. 124.

27Act of July 9, 1897, P.L. 213, sec. 1.
28
Price v. Taylor, 28 Pa. 95, 70 Am. Dec. 105 (1857) ; Beilstein v. Beilstein, 194 Pa. 152, 45
A. 73,
75 Am. St. Rep. 692 (1899).
29
See, English's Estate, 270 Pa. 1, 112 A. 913 (1921).
SOAct of July 15, 1935, P.L. 1013, sec. 1, 20 PS 229.
31See Irwin, Legislative Limiting of the Rule in Shelley's Case in Pa., 40 DICK. L. REV. 27
(1935).
82See, Mitinger's Estate, 132 Pa. Super. 425, 1 A.(2d)

83Note 5, supra, and cases cited.

572 (1938).
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is probable that even the narrowest-minded court would allow the statute to apply in this case since there is nothing requiring the remainder to immediately
follow the life estate, but nevertheless the statute does not clearly express itself
on the point.
Suppose there is a limitation "to A for life, and then to the 'issue' of A".
Does the statute apply here? Certainly the terms of the statute do not embrace
this situation and a court should not be condemned for refusing to apply a
statute which speaks of "heirs" to limitations which speak of "issue" or even
34
"descendants" or "children" when used as words of limitation.
The title of the Act of 1935 reads:
"To limit the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case by providing
that certain grants and devises in trust or otherwise will be construed not to create estates in fee." 35
The words "to limit" show that the legislature did not intend to abolish the rule
in every instance of its former application. There is no reason why a court
should apply its terms to any situation which it does not expressly cover.
There is another serious defect in the Act of 1935. It does not state what
kinds of interests will remain if the Rule of Shelley's Case.is not applied. It
merely states that certain "grants or devises ...shall not operate to give such
life tenant an estate in fee." It has been assumed that the "heirs" will receive
contingent remainders.36 But the Act is not specific on this point.
CONCLUSION

Prior to the Act of 1935 the Rule in Shelley's Case operated with monotonous regularity to give fees to devisees and grantees who received life estates with
remainders to their heirs, or "issue" and even "descendants" or "children."
This was unfortunate since the intentions of numerous unskilled and misguided testators and grantors were cheerfully disregarded. It had one advantage,
however, in that the law was at least comparatively clear. A lawyer could tell
usually whether the Rule in Shelley's Case applied to a given limitation.
The Act of 1935 has "modified" the Rule and thereby muddied the pond.
Under that Act it may take a good many years and a quantity of expensive litigation before we can know the present limitations of the Rule in Shelley's Case
in Pennsylvania.
It would be well if the legislature would immediately consider the wisdom
of amending the Act of 1935 or repealing it and replacing it with one better
suited to accomplish its purposes.
Section 12 of the proposed Uniform Act is well-suited to abolish the Rule
in Shelley's Case. There is only one situation which section 12 does not expressly
cover, and that is the case where there is a gift to "A for life, but if A dies
without issue, then to B in fee." In that limitation there is an implied gift to
84See, Walker's Estate, 240 Pa. 1, 87 A. 281 (1913),
8Act of June 15, 1935, P.L. 1013.
86 See 43 DICK. L. REv. 244.

and notes 18, 19 and 20, supra.

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

"issue". But as has already been noted the Act of 1897 has covered this situation.37
The proposed section would therefore be apt to cover every situation which
might arise. It would completely abolish the Rule of Shelley's Case in Pennsylvania, while the present act only limits the Rule. It is difficult to see why the
Rule should be only limited rather than abolished. It would seem that the Act
of 1935 is the result of a desire for progressive modern law haltered by an inherent wish to cling to outmoded landmarks of the old common law.
It is strongly urged therefore that section 12 be adopted in its proposed
form, so that once and for all the Rule in Shelley's Case might be eliminated
from this Commonwealth.
Section 13. Effect of Conveyance to One and His ChildrenThe Doctrine Known as Rule in Wild's Case Abolished.
"When an otherwise effective conveyance of property is made in
favor of a person and his 'children' or in favor of a person and his
'issue', or by other words of similar import designating the person
and the descendants of the person, whether the conveyance is immediate or postponed, the conveyance creates a life interest in the
person designated and a remainder in his designated descendants,
unless an intent to create other interests is effectively manifested,"
This section is designed to do away with an old rule of construction which
was expressed by dictum in Wild's Case.' That case set up a rule with two
aspects or resolutions.
Where a devise is made to A and his "children" or "issue": (1) If A had
no children or issue at the time the deed or devise became effective, he took an
estate tail "...
for the intent of the devisor is manifest and certain that his
children and issue should take, and as immediate devisees they cannot take, because they are not in rerum natura, and by way of remainder they cannot take
for that was not his intent, for the gift was immediate ....- 2 (2) If A had
children or issue at the time the deed or devise became effective, they all took
as joint tenants for life.
The present section rejects these two resolutions of Wild's Case by stating
that such a conveyance or devise will create an estate for life in A with a remainder "to his designated descendants."
37

See note 28, rupra, and cases cited.
16 Coke 16, 41 Eliz. The case actually was "to A for life, remainder to B in fee tail, remainder to Wild and wife and 'after their decease' to their children." A died. B died without issue and
Wild and wife died. It was held that Wild and wife had life estates and their children took re,
mainders because testator's intent was clear that the children were not to take until the decease of
Wild and his wife. The actual holding of the case is expressed in the little verse: "Devise after
death of man and wife, To children, all, ev'n th' unborn take for life." COKE'S REPORTS IN VERSE
(1825).
26 Coke 16 at 17.
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THE FIRST RESOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA

Where there is a devise to "A and his children" and at the time it takes
effect, A has no children, the first resolution of Wild's Case would give him a
fee tail. Is this the result in Pennsylvania?
In Oyster v. Knull the devise was to "A for his support, and if he should
be spared to have family, I desire the above estate to go to the use of his children." A had no children and attempted to convey a fee. It was held that he
had only a life estate with a remainder to the children. There was no discussion
of Wild's Case.
In Chambers v. Union Trust Co.' there was a devise "to A and to his children". A died and left a will devising the property to the defendants. The
plaintiffs were heirs of the original testator. The court held for the plaintiffs
and in a review of the authorities decided that the first resolution in Wild's Case
did not apply in Pennsylvania. The court said:
"The theory was that, if there were no children in existence at the
time of the devise the provision in their favor would fail altogether; unless the parent were given a fee tail; hence, and for that
reason alone, the first resolution. But with us, where the children
take in remainder, it is immaterial whether they are, or are not, in
existence at thLtime of the devise, or at the time of the death of
the testator . . .Therefore it is not necessary to give an artificial

meaning to the devise in order to care for the interests of the children, and there is no apparent reason for adhering to the first resolution in Wild's Case." 5
It is clear therefore that the first resolution in Wild's Case has been strongly rejected in this Commonwealth.
THE SECOND RESOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA

The second resolution in Wild's Case declares that where there is a gift to
A and his children and A has children at the time it takes effect, A and his
children take joint life estates. This was brought to the attention of the Pennsylvania courts before the first resolution was passed upon, and was approved by
early cases.' However, in Coursey v. Davis7 there was a conveyance of land to
"A and her children, exclusively, and their heirs and assigns." The Court held
that there was a life estate in A with contingent remainders to the children as a
class. This construction would not subject the land to curtesy for the husband of
A, and would let in children born to A after the conveyance. This case was
3137 Pa. 448, 20 A. 624, 21 Am. St. Rep. 890 (1890).
The plaintiff bore the interesting
name of Napoleon K. Oyster.
4235 Pa. 610, 84 A. 512 (1912).
5235 Pa. 610 at615, supra, note 4; Keown's Estate,
238 Pa. 343, 80 A. 270; see, Cote v. Von
Bonnhorst,
41 Pa. 243 (1861).
6
Graham v. Flower, 13 S.& R. 439 (1825) ; Shirlock v, Shirlock, 5 Pa. 367 (1838).
746 Pa. 25, 84 Am.Dec. 519 (1862).
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followed in Hague v. Hague8 where there was a conveyance to "A and her children" and the same result was reached in Crawford v. Forest Oil Co., where
there was a devise to A and his children on condition that A pay money to X
and Y. It is plain therefore that the second resolution in Wild's Case has been
rejected in Pennsylvania.
CONCLUSION

The Pennsylvania rule where there is a grant or devise to A and his children seems to be that:
.*.*. Whether A has children at the testator's death or not, thd
presumption is that a life estate in A, with a remainder in his children, has been created.10o
This result is the same rule that is laid down by section 13. Therefore the
adoption of this section would be a piece of useless legislation which would only
be desirable as part of a general property code. If the whole Act is adopted,
section 13 would be a codification of the Pennsylvania law, and beyond that
would establish nothing.
Section 14. Testamentary Conveyance to the Heirs or Next of Kin of the
Conveyor-Doctrine of Worthier Title Abolished.
"When any property is limited, mediately or immediately, in an
otherwise effective testamentary conveyance, in form or in effect, to
the heirs or next of kin of the conveyor or to a person or persons
who on the death of the conveyor are some or all of his heirs or
next of kin, such conveyees acquire the property by purchase and
not by descent."
Section 15. Inter Vivos Conveyance to the Heirs or
Next of Kin of the Conveyor.
"When any property is limited, in an otherwise effective conveyance inter vivos, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next of kin of
the conveyor, which conveyance creates one or more prior interests
in favor of a person or persons in existence, such conveyance operates in favor of such heirs or next of kin by purchase and not by
descent."
These two sections abolish two rules of the old feudal law which have been
taken over into and have persisted in American law. The first doctrine is that
- . . . Whenever a devise gives to the heir the same estate in quality as he would
have by descent, he shall take by the latter . . ."I The second rule is that where
. an owner of land in fee simple sought to convey a life estate or an estate
8161 Pa. 643, 29 A. 261, 41 Am.St.Rep. 900 (1894).
9208 Pa. 5, 57 A. 47 (1904); also, Vaughan's Estate, 230 Pa. 554, 79 A. 750 (1911); Elliott
v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co., 230 Pa. 423, 79 A. 708 (1911).
102 SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, p. 210, sec. 408. And see Brown, 79 U. OF PA. L.

REV. 385, who suggests that the legislature should turn Pennsylvania back to the rule in Wild's Case.
'Co. Litt. 126 N. (2) by Hargrave (1787). See note, 46 Htv. L. REv. 994.
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tail, with a remainder to the grantor's heirs, the remainder was void and the
grantor had a reversion in fee simple." 2 These two rules, though in their nature
somewhat different and in their application necessarily different, are so closely
akin that writers have often considered them together 3 as different aspects of
the same rule. It is necessary, however, to keep them separated since their present-day aptness to property law differs greatly.
REASONS FOR THE RULES

Probably the primary reason for both of these doctrines was that under the
feudal law an overlord or king received certain feudal rights and incidents when
the land of a vassal passed by descent to his heirs, and these privileges were
lacking when the land passed by grant or devise.4 The early courts being in sympathy with the interests and traditions of the feudal system deemed that a grant
or devise to an heir of what he would take by descent should pass by the
"worthier" title, that of descent.
As regards grants it was also argued, with questionable validity, that a grant
to the heirs of a living man was, in contemplation of law, a grant to the man
himself, since "nemo est baeres viventis" and the heir is part of the ancestore'haeres est

pars antecessoris."5

Both doctrines as a practical matter, originally had some justification in that
creditors of the testator or grantor could subject intestate land to their claims
while land which had been devised or granted away was not subject to their
claims. 6 This reason is no longer important, as regards devises, since devised
property is subject to the claims of creditors.'
Originally these rules applied only to grants or devises of lands. But in
both grants and devises there has been some tendency to extend the rule to personalty. 8
The rule as applied to devises is generally a rule of law. 9 This has now
been relaxed to some extent in grants and is often applied as a rule of construction. 10
APPLICATION OF THE RULES-DEVISES

Whenever there is a devise either immediately or mediately to the heirs of
21 SIMEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, Sec. 144.

SNote, 41 DICK. L. REV. 175. See, 46 HARV. L. Rev. 993, 994; 1 SIMEs, LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS, sec. 144. Restatement of Property, T.D. No. 11, sec. 314 (1939).
41 SiUEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, sec. 145; Restatement of Property, T.D. No. 11, sec.
314 (a) (1939); 46 HARV. L. REv. 993, 994.
5Co. Litt. 22b. 1 SImEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, sec. 145, no. 10.
6
See I SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, Sec. 145.

73 and 4 Will. & M., C. 14 (1691) ; Act of June 7, 1917, P.L. 447, sec. 13 (a).
SSee, 46 HARV. L. REV. 995, n. 13; Restatement of Property, T.D. No. 11, sec. 314 (a).
9
Harper and Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title, 24 ILL. L. REV. 634 (1930).
lORestatement, n. 8, supra, and see, 1 SIMEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, sec, 147.
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the testator, the heirs take by descent and not through the devise, if the estate
devised is the same in quality as the heirs take by descent."
Suppose T, the testator, left Blackacre "to the heirs of T." This is the
simplest case. T's heirs take by descent. 12
Suppose the limitations to be "to A for life and then to the heirs of T."
The rule would apply just as well where there is an intermediate estate as it
does when the gift is immediate.
Again, where there is a devise mediately or immediately to A, and A is the
heir of the testator, A will take by descent and not by purchase even though he
is named specifically and there is no mention of the fact that he is the heir."3
It must be borne in mind, however, in considering these limitations, that
the estate which is left to the heir must be of the same quality as that which he
14
would receive by intestacy, in order to have the doctrine apply.
"To make the heir take by devise," as observed by Lord Eldon in Baily v.
Elkins,15 "there must be an alteration of the limitations of the estate from that
which tht law would make by descent"; as a devise of an estate tail to an heir;
of land in fee to two daughters being testator's heirs; of gavelkind lands to several sons; of all testator's lands to one of two daughters.' 8
Such was the rule that fljurished in the common law as to devises to heirs.
In what way did this rule differ from the rule which forbade a grant to the
grantor's heirs to take effect as such?
GRANTS INTER VIVOS

The chief difference between the two rules was merely one in application.
A conveyance inter vivos takes effect while the grantor is still alive and therefore a great difference of application is necessary from that in a testamentary
disposition.
Suppose there is an inter vivos conveyance to "A in fee", A receives the
land by purchase, and this is not altered by the fact that A subsequently turns
out to be the grantor's heir. This is also true where there is a remainder to a
named person who subsequently becomes the heir of the grantor. Necessarily
liSee
note 1, supra.
2
1 Harper and Heckel, 24 ILL. L. REv. 627, 643.
1846 HARV. L. REv. 995, n. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.

1424 ILL. L. REV. 635:

"The test for the rule . . . is to strike out of the, will the particular

devise to the heir, and then, if without that he would take by descent exactly the same estate which
the devise purports to give him, he is in by descent and not by purchase."
15(1802) 7 Ves. Jr. 319, 32 Eng. Rep. 130; cited notes 36 and 44 in 24 ILL. L. REv. 625.
IdNote to Scott v. Scott, I Eden 458, 23 Eng. Rep. 762 (1759).
This was considered in detail
in 24 ILL. L. REv. 638 et seq. Of the four examples, be it noted' that: (I) An estate tail to an
heir gives him less than the fee simple he would receive by intestacy; (2) daughters inherited intestate land as co-parceners as did (3) sons inherit gavelkind lands. But a devise of land gave it in
joint tenancy, there was enough difference in the two methods of holding lands that the old law said
the quality of the estates were different; (4) two daughters would receive land as co-parceners.
Obviously if all was given to one daughter, she got more than she would by intestacy.
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the application of the rule is different in this inter vivos grant than it would be
in a similar devise. When the devise takes effect it is possible to know that A is

the grantor's heir. But the inter vivos conveyance takes effect while the grantor
is living and it is impossible to know that A is the grantor's heir.
Where, however, there is a grant to A for life and then to the heirs of the
grantor, the rule will operate to nullify the remainder and give a reversion to
the grantor. Thus, if, when the conveyance takes effect, there is a remainder
limited to a class who would be grantor's heirs if he died intestate, the rule is
applied. 7
There is an important consequence of the inter vivos rule which cannot
arise from the testamentary rule. When there is an inter vivos grant with a remainder to th grantor's heirs which becomes a reversion, the grantor, being still
alive, can grant this reversion to strangers or dispose of it in his will.$8 The
"heirs" to whom the remainder was first limited may get nothing. On the other
hand, where there is a devise to the testator's heirs, they will take either by purvalidity of
chase or descent. This difference may be important as regards the
19
the two rules in interpreting the intent of the grantor or testator.
Having ascertained the differences and similarities between the two rules
dealt with by sections 14 and 15, it remains to be seen to what extent these doctrines of "Worthier Title" have been adopted by the common law of Pennsylvania and in what way has legislation affected them, if at all.
DEVISES AND BEQUESTS TO HEIRS OF THE TESTATOR

The doctrine of Worthier Title as applied to wills does not affect personalty in Pennsylvania. 20 It has been acknowledged to exist and to apply to devises
of realty. In Kinney v. Glasgow21 the testator devised land to his son subject to
a charge in favor of his widow for life. It was held that the son, being the heir
of the testator, took by descent and not by purchase, and this despite the
charge. 22 A number of other cases have approved the doctrine in dicta. 28
There are a number of cases, however, which do not mention the doctrine
when it might have been applied. 24 This does not mean, however, that the doc17Restatement of Property, T.D. No. 11, sec. 314 (c) (1939).
181 SIMEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, secs. 145, 146.
19See Restatement of Property, T.D. No. 11, sec. 314 (a): "'Where a person makes a gift in
remainder to his own heirs (particularly where he also gives himself an estate for life) he seldom
intends to create an indestructible interest in those persons who take his property by intestacy, but
intends the same thing as if he had given the remainder 'tomy estate'."
20Hough's Estate, 13 Phila. 279 (1879).
2153 Pa. 141 (1866).
22
That charges and encumbrances did not make the heir take by purchase and not by descent
was in accord with the English common law. See, Harper and Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier
Title, 24 ILL. L. REv. 634 (1930).
23Hartman's Estate, 4 Rawle 39 (1833); Selfridge's Appeal, 9 W. & S. 45 (1845); Wain's
Appeal,
2 4 4 Pa. 502 (1846); Hough's Estate, 18 Phila. 279 (1879).
Donohue v. McNichol, 61 Pa. 73 (1869); Busby's Appeal, 61 Pa. 111 (1869); Stewart's
Estate, 147 Pa. 383, 23 A. 599 (1892); Bache's Estate, 246 Pa. 276, 92 A. 304 (1914); Totham's
Estate, 250 Pa. 269, 95 A. 520 (1915) ; Frisbie's Estate, 266 Pa. 574, 109 A. 66? (1920),
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trine of Worthier Title as applied to devises has disappeared in Pennsylvania. In
all of these cases, it is doubtful that if the doctrine had been applied, the result
would have been any different and it seems clear from the opinions that the doctrine was not called to the court's attention. The most that can be said for these
cases is that they indicate that the bench and bar do not have any great awareness
of the existence of the rule. There is nothing to indicate, however, that the doctrine of Kinney v. Glasgow25 has been overthrown. It is more than probable
that if any situation should arise in which the result would be materially affected
by the doctrine of Worthier Title, and it was argued before the court, it would
be reaffirmed without hesitation. At common law therefore the doctrine has not
been overthrown in Pennsylvania.
INTER

Vivos

GRANTS TO THE HEIRS OF THE GRANTOR

It has been established in Pennsylvania that where a grantor creates an ultimate limitation in favor of his heirs, the limitation will take effect as a reversion to himself rather than as contingent interests to his heirs.2 6 In Root's
Estate?' there was a grant in trust to hold for A for life, with a power of appointment in A, and in default of appointment, to convey to the heirs of the
grantor. It was held that the heirs took by descent and not by purchase and that
the property was liable for the debts of the grantor.
In Brolasky's Estate28 the owner of land declared himself trustee of the
land for his two adopted children, their children and descendants, and their
mother; and if both of them die without children surviving or if such surviving
children shall die under age, to hold in trust for the settlor's right heirs. The
settlor survived all parties in interest except one adopted child and then died intestate. Upon the death of the last child without surviving issue the land was
claimed by those who were the heirs of the testator at his death. His estate also
claimed the land, as did his heirs at the death of the last cestui. It was held that
the last limitation to the heirs of the settlor was void and that thL land would
revert to the estate of the settlor. The doctrine of Worthier Title as applied to
29
grants was clearly affirmed and contrary decisions were disapproved.
It is clear therefore that in the common law of Pennsylvania the doctrine of
Worthier Title has been adopted and applied in both grants inter vivos and de2553 Pa. 141 (1866).
26Root's Estate, 2 W.N.C. 156 (1875) ; Brolasky's Estate, 302 Pa. 439, 153 A. 739 (1931).
272 W.N.C. 156 (1875).
28302 Pa. 439, 153 A. 739 (1931).
29The court noted and disregarded Arrison's Estate, 8 D. & C. 494 (1926) and Bethausen's
Estate, 9 Dist. 603 (1900) which were both cases which did not apply the rule and apparently did
not seriously consider it. However, compare King v. York Trust Company, 278 Pa. 141, 122 A.
227 (1923) where the grantor set up a trust for himself, his wife and his children, for his life, but
on his death to go to his wife and children according to the intestate laws, and if none survived

him, to collateral heirs according to the intestate laws.

The grantor, his wife, and children, tried to

revoke the trust. But it was held irrevocable since "heirs" then unascertainable had interests and
could not be joined. The doctrine of Worthier Title was not mentioned.
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vises. It remains now to be seen what statutory modifications have been made
in the rule.
STATUTORY MODIFICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE

By the Act of 192330 it was provided that when by a grant or devise of
either realty or personalty, a life estate or other estate is created in ". . . any
other person, charity, etc. ... ." with an ultimate limitation to the heirs of the
testator or grantor, "heirs" will be construed to mean "heirs" determined as of
the termination of the preceding estate, rather than "heirs" as of the testator's
or grantor's death. Thus an artificial meaning is set up for "heirs" in certain
situations. How is this statute effective and to what situations does it apply?
"At common law, if the grantor or testator meant 'children' or
those who would be his heirs at the death of the life tenant, or if
in any other way he indicated a class of remaindermen which might
differ from his heirs general, the doctrine of Worthier Title had no
application."$ 1
The statute of 1923 makes a remainder to "heirs" a remainder to an artificial class, not the heirs general of the testator. This is enough to defeat the
operation of the doctrine in every situation where the statute applies.
SITUATIONS WHERE ACT OF

1923

APPLIES

Wills
for the
The Act of 1923 applies wherever there is some prior estate "...
" followed by a limitation to the
use and benefit of any other person, etc ..
heirs of the testator. It also is merely a statute setting up a rule of construction,
which the testator's intention that "heirs" are to be considered as his heirs as of
his death will defeat. Therefore, if the testator makes a devise "To A for life,
remainder to the testator's heirs", the "heirs" will mean the heirs at the death
of A rather than the testator's heirs at his own death. The doctrine of Worthier
Title would not apply. If the testator limited a devise "To A for life, remainder
to my heirs, determined at my death" the expressed intent of the testator would
SOAct of June 29, 1923, P.L. 914, 21 PS 11: ".

. hereafter when in and by the provisions of

any deed or will or other instrument in writing, property, either real or personal, or both, shall be
donated, granted, devised or bequeathed, either directly or in trust, for the use and benefit of any
other person, charity or other use, for years or for life or upon condition, and which shall provide
therein, upon the termination of the estate for years or for life or upon condition or other cause,
the remainder over shall vest in the donor's or grantor's heirs or next of kin or the persons thereunto entitled under the intestate laws, or other similar or equivalent phrase, the same shall be con-

strued as meaning the person or persons thereunto entitled at the time of the termination of the
estate for years or for life or upon condition under the intestate laws of the Commonwealth as they
shall exist at the time of such termination; and such phrase shall not be construed as meaning the
person or persons who were the heirs or next of kin of the donor at the time the grant or donation

was made or at the time the testator died; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall bd
construed to prevent any donor or testator from expressly or by necessary implication directing otherwise; and provided, further, that the provisions of this act shall not apply to any case now pending."
8141 DIcK. L. REv. 175, 181; see 1 SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, sec, 147.
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defeat the operation of the Act of 1923 and the doctrine of Worthier Title
would apply.
Since the Act of 1923 applies only where there are prior limitations it
would not apply to a direct devise to the heirs of the testator. Thus a devise "to
my heirs" or a devise "to A" where A was testator's sole heir, would not be
affected by the Act and the doctrine of Worthier Title would apply.
INTER VIVOS CONVEYANCES

The Act of 1923 will have a considerable effect upon the doctrine that a
grant to the heirs of the grantor is void. As in devises it must be borne in mind
that the Act sets up a mere rule of construction and where the testator's intent is
expressed or made clear by necessary implication, the Act will not apply and the
doctrinie of Worthier Title may be invoked, if there is a limitation to the heirs
general of the grantor.
In the absence of such an indication of the testator's intent the Act will defeat the doctrine of Worthier Title wherever the grantor grants a prior estate to
someone else with a limitation to his own heirs.
There are two limitations which the Act does not cover. The first is the
situation of a direct grant to his own heirs. And the second is a grant in trust
for himself for life with a remainder to his own heirs.
A direct grant to the heirs of the grantor does not fall under the statute
since by its terms, it deals only with situations where there is a previous estate.
However, is such a direct grant possible? A deed to the "heirs" of a living person is void for uncertainty.32 The only way that such a grant might be possible
would be in a deed in trust for the heirs of the grantor. However, such heirs,
disregarding for the moment the doctrine of Worthier Title, would be an unascertained group who could not take until the death of the grantor. There
would be a resulting trust to the grantor for life, and 'the net result of the limitation would be the same as a deed in trust for the use of the grantor for life
with remainder to his heirs, and this is the second situation with which we are
dealing.
By its terms the Act deals with prior limitations "for the use of any other
person", followed by a limitation to the grantor's heirs. It does not cover the
situation where there is a prior estate to the grantor himself followed by a limitation to his own heirs. As far as the Act of 1923 is concerned, therefore, such
a limitation is subject to the doctrine of Worthier Title.
However another statute, the Act of July 15, 1935,33 which modified the
Rule in Shelley's Case, will apply here. It states "Grants or devises in trust or
otherwise . . . which shall express an intent to create an estate for life with remainder to the heirs of the life tenant, shall not operate to give such life tenant
32

See sec. 12, note 29, supra.
33See sec. 12, note 29, supra.
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an estate in fee." This statute applies to all cases where there is a grant to a life
tenant with remainder to the heirs of the life tenant. It certainly seems to cover
a grant in trust for the grantor for life with a remainder to his heirs. What is
the result of the statute? Such a limitation shall not operate ".

.

. to give such

life tenant an estate in fee." This, however, is the very result if the doctrine of
Worthier Title is applied. The ultimate limitations to the heirs of the grantor
would be changed to a reversion in the grantor producing "an estate in fee" in
the life tenant. It would seem therefore that in this situation the doctrine of
Worthier Title as applied to inter vivos conveyances, no longer exists in Pennsylvania. The only strength which it still retains is where the grantor overcomes
the statutory presumption of the Act of 1923 and indicates that by "heirs" he
means his heirs general.
In speaking of the doctrine of Worthier Title, it was said in Brolasky's
Estate,34 ".

.

. Being part of the English Common Law . . . (it) thereafter con-

tinued as part of our common law, until, by the Act of June 29, 1923, P. L.
914, a different rule was directed to be applied in the future." This dictum was
broader than the statute warranted but nevertheless it indicates a readiness on the
part of the court to accept broad changes.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of Worthier Title exists in a modified form even today in the
common law of Pennsylvania. The old reasons for its existence have totally disappeared. 85 It remains to be seen if there is any valid modern reason for its existence. In regard to devises it seems difficult to find any reason for the existence of the doctrine. However, in inter vivos conveyances there may be some
justification for the doctrine as a rule of construction. Thus, the reporters of the
Restatement of Property 36 take the view that a grantor by an ultimate limitation
"to my heirs" is merely expressing his real intent "to my estate." However, in
Pennsylvania, the Act of 1923 has modified the doctrine of Worthier Title. It
seems inconvenient to allow it to remain in regard to inter vivos conveyances
and destroy it in regard to devises. Finally, the doctrine makes the testator's
words mean what they do not say, or rather it eliminates some of the testator's
words. This is always undesirable, and any rule with that result should be abrogated.
"We are aware that this conclusion antagonizes a cardinal rule in
the present day construction of written instruments, in that it
wholly eliminates a portion of the language of the deed, to which
portion an effect might readily be given; but we are also aware
that through the centuries the conclusion reached in the cases cited
has been a rule of property, to overturn which might unsettle many
34Supra, n. 27.
36
6

302 Pa. at 444.

See 41 DiC. L. REv. at 177 and notes 15, 16, 17, 18, supra.
Sxpra, a. 20.
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should be made, if at all, by prospectitles; and hence the 3change
7
tive legislation only."
The elimination of the doctrine is desirable and the court has here indicated
that the only way that it can be eliminated is by legislation.
Therefore, it is recommended that section 14, of the proposed Act, which
will do away with the doctrine of Worthier Title in testamentary gifts, should be
adopted. It is further recommended that section 15 of the proposed Act should
be also adopted in order to destroy the doctrine of Worthier Title in its application to conveyances inter vivos. Both of these sections are suitable to this purpose without change in their wording.
ERIE, PA.

JOHN W. ENGLISH
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8 Mr. Justice Simpson in Brolasky's Estate, 302 Pa. 339, at 347 (1931).

